One of the fundamental principles of the NPT, an essential part of the nonproliferation bargain, is the right of NNWS to produce nuclear power for peaceful use in exchange for abstaining from acquiring nuclear weapons (Article IV). Despite that bargain, the actual legal interpretation of the rights of NNWS and obligations of NWS remains a matter of strong debate. The rights afforded to NNWS by Article IV arguably conflict with the overarching purpose of the NPT, to prevent nuclear proliferation. Lawrence Scheinman states that the primary challenge is “…how to reconcile the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with preventing states from using their nuclear knowledge, technology, and assets to acquire nuclear weapons.”¹ This issue has become particularly salient in the wake of Iran’s nuclear energy (and suspected weapons) program.

Article IV establishes two “rights” for NNWS—“to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (so long as it is in conformity with nonproliferation and safeguards obligations) and to participate in the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technology information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”² The right of NNWS to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has not been broadly challenged by NWS within the context of the NPT, but there remains a great deal of debate over the legal meaning of the cooperation and exchange aspect of Article IV. Many NNWS argue that Article IV provides an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear technology, or the more contentious view, to be given the technology to develop nuclear fuel by NWS. Proliferation concerns take a backseat to this inalienable right. Some governments have even argued that export controls are a violation of Article IV, as it prevents NNWS from receiving the necessary technology (e.g., Iran argues that the peaceful use article means they should be given any technology they desire, and NWS that do not provide the technology are not in compliance with Article IV, regardless of proliferation and security concerns.)³

Some governments (primarily the US/West) point to the need to control nuclear technology as part of NPT nonproliferation obligations. The “inalienable right” is for the benefits of nuclear energy, not the technology itself. That right is negated if technology sharing conflicts with nonproliferation—specifically, effective IAEA safeguards and the ability to ensure a timely warning system if a state diverts nuclear power to a weapons system (both are unfeasible at this time due to limited IAEA resources). One of the key concerns here is that NNWS will use their rights under Article IV to develop/acquire nuclear technology, then turn around and use the same technology to develop nuclear weapons.

Uranium enrichment is a necessary step in creating fuel for nuclear energy, but it is also the main barrier to developing nuclear weapons, due to the expense and technical expertise necessary for the enrichment process. About 75% of the work required to make bomb-grade uranium is expended in making reactor-grade fuel enriched to 3.5% of U235. However, once a nation has that capability, it only takes about 15% more time to turn it into research facility-grade 20% highly enriched uranium (HEU)—as Iran claims to have done. Here’s the problem—it only takes about 3% more time and effort to continue enriching it to bomb-grade fissile material of 90% U235—using the same technology. A state could reach “breakout capacity,” and subsequently withdraw from the NPT—all within its rights under the NPT. Then, with the turn of a screwdriver, it could develop nuclear weapons and become a de facto NWS without the treaty constraints.

The dual use nature of the fuel cycle presents a significant challenge to global security and the nonproliferation regime. The problems associated with the ability to safeguard and verify in a timely manner can potentially lead to a world in which there are numerous members in the nuclear club. We are witnessing an increase in the number of states that desire nuclear energy; many governments in the Middle East have expressed the desire to develop nuclear energy programs, largely in response to Iran’s program. More nuclear energy leads to additional security problems, such as unsecured nuclear materials or an increased threat of insiders diverting nuclear materials to terrorists (e.g., A.Q. Khan’s network).⁴

Currently, there are two proposed solutions to this challenge. The first, supported by the U.S., is the internationalization of the fuel cycle, which would provide the benefits of nuclear technology to NNWS without providing the sensitive technologies that would alter global security and weaken the nonproliferation regime. Second is the push by international civil society to shift the energy focus from nuclear power to renewable fuels, which combats both proliferation and climate concerns. Last year, many governments signed on to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) to promote the adoption of renewable energy worldwide. One thing is clear—until there is credible verification and safeguarding methods, NPT states parties should avoid pushing for their “inalienable right” to nuclear energy at the expense of nonproliferation.