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A New START for Arms Control

In April, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), to replace the 1991 START I, which expired last December. The treaty is currently the subject of hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a vote on ratification is expected sometime in August or September. For the arms control community, the New START represents a significant step in achieving a nuclear weapons free world. Although the Obama administration has strong support for the treaty from a bipartisan group of national security figures, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, this is an important issue requiring prompt and effective mobilization to ensure swift ratification.

What does the New START do?

The New START treaty has two primary objectives. First, the treaty results in a modest reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles—about 30 percent below current levels. Strategic deployed nuclear warheads will be limited to 1,550, down from the 1,700-2,200 limits in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Strategic bombs and land and sea based missiles will be limited to no more than 800, down from 1,600 under START I.1 The treaty also creates an updated, streamlined, and modern verification system to ensure that both Russia and the U.S. reduce their warheads to levels agreed upon in the treaty. The transparency and accountability provisions in New START will provide an accurate accounting of Russia’s deployed nuclear weapons.

What are the benefits of the New START?

The treaty is a crucial part of advancing President Obama’s Prague agenda of global nuclear disarmament. It is essential to building global support for the nonproliferation and disarmament movement—without leadership from the U.S. and Russia, it is impossible to expect other countries to support nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. As national security threats increase due to the risk of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, international support is essential. One of the most contentious issues at the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was stagnant progress on disarmament. The New START is a significant step that will signal to the world that the U.S. and Russia are willing to honor their NPT disarmament commitments, which will bolster U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

There are also powerful national security arguments to support New START ratification. Reductions in Russia’s nuclear force and the accurate accounting of Russia’s deployed weapons provided by the transparency and accountability provisions significantly decrease the nuclear threat posed by Russia. New START also serves to increase cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and supports a multilateral approach to nonproliferation and disarmament. As Former Secretary of State James Baker stated

“…it appears to take our country in a direction that can enhance our national security while at the same time reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the planet. It can also improve Washington’s relationship with Moscow regarding nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, a relationship that will be vital if the two countries are to cooperate in order to stem nuclear proliferation in countries such as Iran and North Korea.”2

The treaty also helps to secure vulnerable nuclear materials that contribute to nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorist threats. Further, it is an important contribution to the process of dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons before they fall into the wrong hands.

Addressing the Counterarguments

Some people have expressed concern over how the treaty affects missile defense, weapons modernization and the Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “the treaty does not limit U.S. missile defense in a serious way.”3 The Obama administration responds to modernization concerns with the argument that they have increased the nuclear security administration’s budget by 10 percent in the last year and plan to spend $80 billion over the next 10 years to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex. It is also important to note that the nuclear weapons labs already have sufficient resources to maintain and extend the life of existing warheads, and modernization is already underway. Although New START does not limit Russia’s non-strategic warheads, the Obama administration plans to include this issue in future negotiations. This option will not be possible if New START is not ratified.

The New START treaty is an important step in achieving our goal of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons and in improving U.S. and global security. With all the partisan politics in Washington, it is time to raise our voices in support of the New START treaty and a new direction in our nuclear policy.

Written by Holly Lindamood, Program Director

  1. For more detailed information, see “New START at a Glance” Arms Control Association Fact sheet http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART. []
  2. Former Secretary of State James Baker, Opening Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 19, 2010. []
  3. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 2010. []

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