July 3rd, 2008
Is the NPT a Relic of the Cold War?
July 1st is the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). At the height of the Cold War, the NPT forged a new path in international politics by derailing nuclear proliferation. With the recent world changes, though, it is not certain that NPT will continue to be effective in the coming years. The United States and Russia are touting the importance of maintaining a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Testing Ban (CTBT), and there is a burgeoning nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia. Can the NPT survive this new wave of proliferation?
One of the biggest challenges to the NPT is the renewed importance that the nuclear weapons states are placing on nuclear weapons in their national security posture. Russian officials have stated that they have no qualms about using force to protect their nation, including the use of nuclear weapons. Both Russia and NATO have reserved the right of first use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is seeking new capabilities, such as reliable replacement warheads (RRW), which extend the life and increase the yield of existing nuclear weapons. Both the U.S. and Russia still have nuclear ballistic missiles on hair trigger alert. Russia feels threatened by U.S. plans to put antiballistic missile interceptors in Central and Eastern Europe, and has stated repeatedly this may provoke an attack on missile sites. Lax security of existing stockpiles of Russian and U.S. nuclear arms provide an opportunity for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of extremists who cannot be deterred.
A second challenge to the NPT is the U.S.-India nuclear deal. The NPT bans direct and indirect assistance to another nation’s nuclear weapons program. The nuclear materials provided by the U.S. will free up India’s existing uranium to make new bombs. India has exploded nuclear bombs before, and has not made any commitment to eliminating its nuclear weapons program or to stop testing the weapons. By allowing nuclear cooperation, the U.S. is indirectly aiding India’s nuclear weapons program, and is, in effect, violating the NPT. Additionally, granting India special privileges gives the Indian government no incentive to ever join the NPT.
Finally, recent international proliferation activities, such as North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the possibility Iran’s withdrawal, and the new arms race in the Middle East and South Asia all have the potential to significantly hamper the nonproliferation regime and lead to dangerous implications. The disregard shown for the NPT by these nations encourages other nations to either withdraw from the treaty or to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programs, resulting in whole variety of security issues for other nations. A Middle East nuclear arms race sends the signal that the NPT is unable to continue to prevent nuclear proliferation. For example, according to IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, if Iran withdraws from NPT and prohibits IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, it would be possible for Iran to build a nuclear weapon within six months. Other nations may be enticed to develop nuclear weapons for security purposes, leading to a two fold problem. First, there would not be an accurate accounting of the number of nuclear weapons that exist, or who has those weapons, thus increasing the security risks of every nation. The South Asian nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has already exhibited the dangers of additional nuclear weapons states, with several close calls over the years. Second, these nations would not be subject to international security standards, creating a real possibility that nuclear material, technology, and weapons can be stolen. Even governments may unintentionally pass along sensitive information to the wrong people.
With all of the challenges posed by the new international order, is it possible for the nuclear nonproliferation regime to survive? Dr. Jim Walsh of the Center for International Studies at MIT argues that “a perception of failure weakens the nonproliferation regime.” So how can the international community improve the perception of the NPT? The timing is perfect—the 2010 NPT Review Conference will provide an opportunity for nations to renew their commitment to nonproliferation and act to strengthen the treaty. Some needed changes to the NPT include:
• Introducing new mechanisms for withdrawal, including penalties or sanctions
• Increasing transparency, accountability and irreversibility
• Establishing a Nuclear Weapons Convention
• Completing negotiations for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
• Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the 9 remaining annex nations
• A time frame for the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapons states
• Amending the NPT to include India, Pakistan, and Israel as nuclear weapons states
The NPT can survive the next forty years, but it will take a strong commitment and meaningful action from all nations to forge ahead with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.
July 28th, 2008 at 12:13 pm
I agree with many points in the post, but one clue is often forgotten here. In 1995 the Parties to the NPT at the NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely in exchange to the promise to pursue establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East (NWFZ in ME). The Resolution on the Middle East comes along with the Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The 2010 NPT Conference is coming up and no progress has been made with regard to establishing NWFZ in ME. Moreover, many scholars and diplomats try to avoid mentioning this issue as one of the key points to the NPT survival. However, representatives of Arab Nations are getting more and more vocal regarding direct connection between the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and future existence of the NPT.
July 29th, 2008 at 6:01 am
You make a good point, Elena. At the Middle Powers Initiative’s Article VI Forum in Dublin recently, the Egyptian representative, Hossam Aly, all but said that unless the 5 NWS make a significant effort towards creating a NWFZ in the ME, the 2010 Review Conference would be as unsuccessful as the 2005 Conference. However this is but one of many failures of the NWS, the most important being the failure to negotiate disarmament in good faith.