It’s 5 Minutes to Midnight

On January 17, 2007, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock two minutes closer to midnight, where it presently remains at five minutes to midnight. The Doomsday Clock measures how close the world is to self destructing – mainly via nuclear weapons. In a press release, the scientific group explains the shift, because “we stand at the brink of a second nuclear age. Not since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has the world faced such perilous choices.” The Doomsday Clock has only been closer to midnight twice since the initial use of an atomic bomb – four minutes in 1981 and three minutes in 1984. On the 63rd anniversary of those bombings, it is time to consider the severity of the current state of nuclear proliferation and what steps we can take to tip the precarious balance away from nuclear annihilation.

How have we reached the brink of a new nuclear age – one scarier and more uncertain than ever before? Many blame the recent proliferation on non-nuclear weapons states acquiring nuclear technology, and certainly that contributed. Unfortunately, a large share of the blame also lies with nuclear weapons states, particularly the U.S. and Russia. Instead of continuing along a path of disarmament, they are now gearing towards a nuclear policy reminiscent of the Cold War. As noted by George Monbiot in The Guardian, “By failing to disarm and breaking the rules when it suits, nuclear states are driving proliferation as much as Ahmadinejad.”

In the past seven years, the U.S. has witnessed an almost complete reversal in nuclear policy. The U.S. has replaced a no first use policy with one that condones preemptive nuclear strikes, even upon non-nuclear weapons states. During his administration, President Bush has threatened certain countries, such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, with nuclear attacks. So far, the U.S. has appeared supportive of Israel’s possible intention to bomb Iran, even if Israel uses nuclear weapons. In 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, so that it could focus on designing a missile defense system without being in violation of the treaty. Since then, missile defense has been ongoing in national defense legislation. A 2007 amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act, which passed 90-5, established U.S. policy to develop and deploy a national missile defense as soon as possible, while a 2004 amendment proposed an acceleration of the testing process. There have also been numerous amendments to defense authorization and budget acts which attempt to increase funding for missile defense. Missile defense tends to spur proliferation, as governments must look to improve their own offensive capabilities. U.S. desires to place missile defense interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic have drawn statements from Russia that this will be seen as an act of war.

In the arena of disarmament, the U.S. is also reneging on the agreement made in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to reduce its nuclear arsenal, and shifting policy towards a goal of not only maintaining, but also modernizing, its nuclear arsenal. In 2003, the Senate agreed to an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act by a 59-38 vote which repeals the prohibition on research and development of low yield nuclear weapons. Urged by President Bush, Congress attempted to pass an amendment earlier this year that allows for reliable replacement warheads (RRW), which replaces the warheads on the current nuclear arsenal with better ones. Although the administration vehemently denies the need for nuclear testing, many have argued that it is unlikely that warheads will be replaced without testing. The U.S. has been under a nuclear testing moratorium for many years, but that could change in an instant. In July, General Ken Chilton, a top nuclear weapons commander, stated that “the nation should not rule out the possibility of resuming nuclear testing to ensure the reliability of the U.S. strategic arsenal.” Further, the U.S. has avoided working towards extending the provisions of the START II Treaty, which are set to expire soon.

It is a scary time. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) worked well as a policy during the Cold War, but is it possible to maintain that policy in a new nuclear age? First, the more players in a game, the more difficult it will be to place any kind of trust—even a trust in mutual assured destruction. With the likelihood of back door deals and alliances, more players in the game increases uncertainty. Further, the potential for accidents increases once more nuclear weapons states enter the game. The international scene is shifting and everyday bringing the world that much closer to nuclear destruction. Is there a solution? Unfortunately, no easy, cookie cutter solution exists, but the nuclear states must begin working towards a solution before it is too late. Taking clear steps towards eventual disarmament will show the world that the nuclear states are keeping their word and may prevent other nations arming as a protective measure. Let’s not wait until the clock strikes 12:00!

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