At the international level, Shen² argues that sanctions are more successful when four conditions are met. First, sanctions should be legitimate through international law and moral standards. Second, the costs of the sanctions on those who impose sanctions must be considered. If the cost is greater than the benefit to the state imposing the sanctions, sanctions are less likely to be effective. Third, sanctions are more likely to be successful when there is a high degree of international consensus and participation. Finally, the strength of the sanctions to act as a deterrent determines success. A state may choose to bear the cost of the sanctions if the sanctions do not affect their primary interests.

Considering the above arguments, can we expect sanctions to effectively change Iran’s nuclear policy? To date, sanctions have been relatively ineffective, as Iran has not given in to international pressure in the nuclear realm. The possibility remains, though, that persistent pressure and sanctions may change the tide in Iran. On the domestic side, strong state autonomy and capacity suggest that sanctions will not be effective. Most of the authority remains in the hands of the Supreme Leader. And candidates are vetted, preventing any strong opposition from developing to disrupt the state. Additionally, Iran has a large oil income³ , which provides revenue to compensate those most affected by sanctions if necessary. One factor that may turn the tide is the legitimacy of the ruler’s right to rule given by domestic groups. Reform groups provide a forum for opposition to the state, and former President Mohammad Khatami recently announced that he will run for president once again. Khatami tends to lean towards the reformist camp, which potentially plays an important role in the decision to comply with sanctions. Overall, there is still a large degree of support for the legitimacy of the Iranian state and the state still possesses the ability to coerce domestic groups, as evidenced by the recent crackdown on opposition groups. On the domestic side, it looks unlikely that sanctions will force Iran to comply with the international community.

However, the international conditions for successful sanctions suggest that sanctions may be more likely to be successful. Three of the four conditions are clearly met. Sanctions are legitimate by international law and moral standards, as nuclear nonproliferation is an international norm backed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). There is no discernible negative impact on the sanctions imposing regimes, and the costs of imposing sanctions do not appear to outweigh the potential benefits. Although slow to start, there is now a high degree of international consensus. Several major global banking institutions have terminated or decreased business with Iran⁴ , and the U.N. Security Council has passed three resolutions providing for sanctions. Although these conditions have been met, what may finally tip the scales is if the fourth condition is met—the strength of sanctions as a deterrent. Oil accounts for a large portion of Iran’s oil revenues, but the remainder of the economy continues to decline, and reform has been unsuccessful. There is a high degree of inequality in the distribution of income, as well as high unemployment and high inflation.⁵ Returning to the domestic factors for a moment, such economic turmoil may provide the impetus for a decline in the legitimacy of the government.