President Obama’s Prague speech in April, calling for the global elimination of nuclear weapons, has reinvigorated the nuclear weapons debate, and for the first time since the end of the Cold War, it actually seems possible that the U.S. nuclear posture will change to meet this goal. While nuclear weapons remain an integral part of U.S. security, changing geopolitical conditions make it necessary for the U.S. to shift the fundamental goals of its nuclear policy.

Why do we need a new nuclear weapons policy?

There are two main reasons why the U.S. needs a new nuclear weapons policy. First, the Obama administration’s commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons provides a fresh opportunity for the U.S. to live up to its disarmament commitments and advance the global nonproliferation agenda. Both the U.S. and Russia have already made cuts to their strategic nuclear arsenals, but with the START extension talks and the upcoming NPT Review Conference, the U.S. has the opportunity to take the lead in international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, as well as dramatically shift its nuclear policy in favor of minimal deterrence. Second, changing geopolitical conditions since the end of the Cold War have fundamentally shifted U.S. security concerns. The threat of nuclear terrorism, new proliferators (North Korea and Iran), the illicit transfer of nuclear technologies (Pakistan), and a powerful China seeking to increase its nuclear stockpile all underscore the need for a nuclear policy that will meet these new challenges.

The CFR nuclear policy task force has identified three main challenges that the U.S. will need to address in its upcoming nuclear policy review. The first challenge concerns both Russia and China. In the case of Russia, recent tensions between the two countries as a result of proposed NATO expansion into former Soviet republics, the Russian—Georgian conflict, and U.S. efforts to place missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic have created tension that makes it more difficult to advance nuclear disarmament. Both the U.S. and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons that remain on hair trigger alert, a situation reminiscent of Cold War dangers of misperception and miscalculation. At the same time, China is believed to be increasing its nuclear arsenal, possibly in response to U.S. missile defense programs. Although China has adopted a “no first use” policy, the lack of transparency from the U.S. strategic posture makes the possibility of nuclear mishaps a real possibility.

The threat of nuclear terrorism poses additional challenges to U.S. nuclear policy. First, traditional deterrence measures do not work when dealing with terrorists groups because traditional deterrence measures are directed specifically towards states. Terrorist groups are non-state actors, so there is no clear way to retaliate. Second, the availability of nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies, coupled with a lack of security, allow terrorist groups easier access to nuclear weapons and fissile material. One of the key points noted in the task force report is that although the U.S. has dismantled many nuclear weapons in accordance with U.S./Russian disarmament agreements, the plutonium has yet to be converted into non—weapons usable form. Likewise, unsecured nuclear materials and unaccounted for nuclear weapons in Russia increase the potential for nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism.

What Can We Do?

Although it is not feasible at this time to completely dismantle the U.S. nuclear arsenal, several steps can be taken that will enhance security, while at the same time signaling to the international community that the U.S. is serious about achieving its nonproliferation and disarmament objectives. The CFR task force report provides several policy recommendations aimed at combating the new nuclear threats. First and foremost, the U.S. needs to open strategic dialogues with the major nuclear powers, especially Russia and China. A binding and verifiable arms control agreement with Russia is paramount to reinforcing the nonproliferation regime. To bring China into the fold, U.S. transparency and open discussions of security goals will be important to preventing a Sino-U.S. nuclear arms race. To prevent widespread proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism, the U.S. needs to accomplish two things. First, the U.S. must ensure the security of its existing nuclear stockpile and make plutonium conversion into non—weapons usable form a priority. Second, the U.S. must ensure the reliability of its existing nuclear stockpile in order to maintain a credible deterrent, while at the same time reaffirming its extended deterrence commitment to its allies. If the U.S. successfully changes its nuclear policy to meet its current and future challenges and continues to commit to global nonproliferation and disarmament, we may indeed see a shifting of the winds that will bring the world to a safer place.

For a more detailed analysis of the current threats, challenges, and policy recommendations, see CFR’s Independent Task Force Report No. 62. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” www.cfr.org