Spaced Out

Outer space is the new frontier for both peace and war, and as more nations enter the “space race,” a comprehensive and robust space security treaty regime is needed to ensure the use of space solely for peaceful purposes. However, the U.S. government has thwarted international interests by blocking negotiations to create a new treaty regime for the past 30 years.

Space security is comprised of the rules that govern the use of space. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) was adopted in 1967 to regulate space activity. Space security initially consisted of the principle that outer space should be accessible to all countries and that space should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Article IV of the OST specifically states that space cannot be used for nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and prohibited weapons testing in space.1 From its entry into force until the Reagan administration, the OST served to prevent the weaponization of space. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union utilized space to provide deterrence stability, rather than for offensive or defensive military capabilities. In keeping with the theme of deterrence stability, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty restricted the U.S. and Soviet Union from developing widespread ABM defense systems.

While the OST succeeded in banning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space, it lacks several key provisions, such as prevention mechanisms for placing conventional weapons in space, sending ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads through space, and deploying most types of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT).2 Article III of the OST states that the exploration and use of outer space must be in accordance with international law3, but the wording is vague and does not set forth provisions to ensure the continued peaceful use of space. With the increase in space faring activity and the development of space based technology, the OST does not provide a robust framework for regulating the use of space for military objectives. International attempts to negotiate additional treaties to control new technology and a changing international climate have not produced results, often being foiled by the U.S.’s desire to protect its plans for missile defense systems. In fact, the U.S. has flat out refused to negotiate explicit rules to ban either attacks on space objects or the deployment of space weapons.4

Current U.S. space weapons policy shifted during the Cold War during the Reagan administration. Rather than continue with a space policy based on the idea of deterrence stability, the Reagan administration shifted to a policy that stressed the importance of space for use in war, including refusing to negotiate mutual ASAT bans and focusing on the acquisition of offensive and defensive space weapons, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars.”5 Actions by the Bush administration reinforced U.S. policy towards the use of space for military purposes. The U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and attempted to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, signaling to the world the U.S. desire for space based dominance.

According to Gallagher and Steinbruner, “U.S. planning documents project not only the development of more advanced military support satellites but also the introduction of anti-satellite weapons, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based global strike weapons” in order to quickly respond to threats and deny space capabilities to other countries.6 The destabilizing potential for such policies is real and dangerous, and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament gains may be lost. Other countries may preemptively attack U.S. space weapons, nuclear weapons states may intentionally buildup their nuclear arsenals to provide additional security, and new states may be encouraged to enter the nuclear arms race as a deterrent to U.S. domination. China is already suspected of increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile in an effort to counter U.S. plans for missile defense.

Where to Go from Here

The Obama administration has taken an important step by shifting U.S. policy on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, but it is vital that space security also become a part of this dialogue. The role of space in the use of war must be addressed and there must be a fundamental policy shift. President Obama made a good first move in preventing the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe. To follow through, he must now abandon the idea of missile defense systems entirely. Staying the course on missile defense will continue to signal to the international community that the U.S. is not willing to work towards a comprehensive international regime regulating the use of space for war. Without explicit rules banning the weaponization of outer space, Earth is going to become a more dangerous place to live.

Written by Holly Lindamood, Program Director

For a more detailed analysis of space security and negotiating a comprehensive framework, see the policy brief written by Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner “Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security.”

  1. 1967 Outer Space Treaty http://history.nasa.gov/1967treaty.html []
  2. Gallagher, Nancy and John D. Steinbruner. 2008. “Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security.” Policy Brief, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, American Academy of Arts and Science. []
  3. 1967 Outer Space Treaty []
  4. Gallagher and Steinbruner. []
  5. Ibid. []
  6. Ibid. []

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