The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, but it is in peril. Failure to agree on a substantive final document at the 2005 Review Conference seriously threatened both the NPT and the regime. The upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference will be an important opportunity for states to renew their nonproliferation and disarmament commitments and to initiate significant policy changes that would strengthen and advance the nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

As part of their NPT commitment, member states convene every five years to review the treaty and generate consensus on NPT issues (such as compliance) in an effort to sustain the treaty. Sometimes member states reach agreement on substantive issues, but often they do not—and the disarmament pillar is historically the most controversial issue. The NPT created a system of haves and have nots—the five nuclear powers existing at the NPT’s inception agreed to undertake disarmament in exchange for the promise that states that did not possess nuclear weapons would not acquire them in the future. Article VI of the NPT (the disarmament pillar) states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Unfortunately, due to the vague wording of the disarmament commitment and the lack of a specific timetable to guide nuclear states, the disarmament pillar has failed to produce any significant reductions in nuclear arsenals among the nuclear weapons states.

Although nuclear weapons states have reduced their nuclear arsenals in the past 20 years, non nuclear weapons states argue these reductions are minimal and do not reflect compliance with NPT disarmament obligations. Nuclear weapons states dispute this—particularly the U.S. and Russia, who, through bilateral treaties, have made what they consider to be substantial reductions to their nuclear arsenals. They argue that they are in compliance, but must continue to maintain security. The International Court of Justice (the judicial branch of the United Nations), in their 1996 advisory opinion, interpreted Article VI to mean that nuclear weapons states are obligated to conclude negotiations on disarmament.

After the inability to even initiate discussion on the substantive issues at the 2005 review, the ongoing dispute over whether nuclear weapons states have lived up to their disarmament commitments may be the death knell to the NPT. Many non-nuclear weapons states have grown disillusioned with the treaty and are considering nuclear armaments of their own. The 2010 NPT Review Conference is crucial to strengthening the disarmament pillar and provides an important opportunity for nuclear weapons states to signal their commitment to disarmament. Unilateral disarmament is unlikely, so disarmament must occur through strengthened international treaties.

In the upcoming months, the most important steps that the U.S. can take to signal its own commitment and encourage the remaining nuclear weapons states to follow their lead include:

• Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Of the nuclear weapons states, only the U.S. and China have yet to ratify the CTBT. Ratifying the CTBT signifies two things—first, it sends a strong signal to the international community that the nuclear weapons states have no intention of increasing their nuclear arsenals and restarting the arms race; second, ratification by all of the nuclear weapons states will encourage holdouts such as India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT, bringing them into the nonproliferation fold.

• Initiate negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has failed to produce a program of activity since 1996. Member states have agreed to begin negotiations for the FMCT, but have been unable to establish a negotiating committee. Since the CD operates by consensus, the U.S. should use diplomacy and soft power to encourage all members to agree to a program and organize a committee to begin immediate negotiations on a FMCT.

• Adhere to Irreversibility: Although the U.S. has undergone significant reductions in its nuclear arsenal (via bilateral treaties with Russia), the nuclear weapons are not dismantled. U.S. nuclear weapons remain in tact, but are not on operational status. To signal a commitment to disarmament, the U.S. needs to immediately dismantle all non-operational weapons, so that disarmament efforts cannot be reversed.

U.S. disarmament is crucial to strengthening the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. By adhering to the previously agreed upon practical steps, the U.S. can take the lead and utilize its position to make substantive progress towards global disarmament.