From the inception of the NPT, one of its primary goals has been to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To accomplish this goal, the NPT establishes a mutually reinforcing agreement between state parties. Under the nonproliferation pillar, non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) agree not to develop or acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to subject peaceful nuclear technology to safeguards agreements.¹ Informal negative security assurances from nuclear weapons states (NWS) provide additional incentives to NNWS. The nonproliferation pillar has, for the most part, been successful; however, certain challenges remain. As Susan Burk, Special Representative of the President on Nuclear Nonproliferation, notes, the “pillars are integrally related and interdependent.”² To achieve a strong and binding treaty that directly links disarmament and nonproliferation, the upcoming NPT Review Conference will need to resolve several challenges: the treaty’s lack of universality, problems with compliance and verification, and strengthening the withdrawal clause.
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The NPT has helped stem the tide of nuclear proliferation. Most member states comply with the treaty, and several states with nascent nuclear weapons programs (i.e. South Africa) abolished their programs and joined the NPT. In spite of this, the treaty’s lack of universality continues to present challenges to nonproliferation. India, Pakistan, and Israel continue to repudiate the NPT, as none are willing to relinquish their nuclear weapons arsenals, thus diminishing regional security. Israel’s nuclear arsenal has induced other states in the region (e.g., Iran) to reconsider the desirability of nuclear weapons and impedes the widely supported goal of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone. Since the three nuclear weapons states outside the NPT have been unwilling to disarm, one possible solution is to amend the treaty to include India, Pakistan, and Israel as NWS. Unfortunately, amending the treaty would further weaken nonproliferation efforts and is unlikely due to stringent amendment procedures. The nuclear “have-nots” are already disenchanted by the failure of NWS to comply with their disarmament obligations. Including additional NWS, states that clearly have no intention of disarming, would further increase this frustration and obstruct cooperation, which decreases regional stability and increases the risk of arms races.

Other challenges have developed due to the lack of universality, such as non-compliance and withdrawal from the NPT. Recently, some states are reneging on their NPT commitments and looking to join the nuclear club. The absence of mechanisms in the NPT to ensure compliance has been an issue at the past several review conferences. One of the major problems is that the definition of compliance is not clear, and as a result, many cases of non-compliance remain unreported.³ Another problem with non-compliance is the ineffective verification system of the NPT. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) lacks the funding and the power to adhere to its mandate. Many states have not signed the Additional Protocol (which grants the IAEA additional inspection rights) and there is no enforcement mechanism—outside of military or diplomatic action—to ensure compliance. The ability of states to withdraw from the treaty with minimal repercussions poses further challenges to its viability. At the 2009 NPT Preparatory Conference, the European Union (EU) submitted a working paper suggesting concrete steps to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar, including determining the consequences of non-compliance and withdrawal (including suspension of nuclear cooperation and transfers), strengthening the IAEA safeguards systems through the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol, and strengthening export controls.⁴

Reaching consensus on challenges to the nonproliferation pillar at the 2010 Review Conference will go a long way towards strengthening the NPT. To fully address these challenges, states parties must also work within the nonproliferation regime to encourage universal adherence to nuclear nonproliferation. Since universal ratification of the treaty is unlikely at this point, there are several things that can be done to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Bringing India, Pakistan, and Israel into the fold of the nonproliferation regime through Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification will prevent additional proliferation and decrease the likelihood of future arms races. The development of a nuclear weapons convention, as proposed by civil society, will increase motivation of all states to resist proliferating and to accelerate the disarmament process. Negative security assurances must be codified as a preventive measure against proliferation. Such confidence building measures, both at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and within the nonproliferation regime, will go a long way towards achieving the global elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons.