A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) is “a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons.”¹ The idea for a Middle East NWFZ was first introduced in 1974 and is supported by annual UN General Assembly resolutions. The final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference included a resolution on a Middle East NWFZ in the final document. All states in the region, including Israel (which is not a states party to the NPT), have expressed support, at least in principle, for the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ. In the past 35 years, however, there has been little effort to negotiate the terms and no progress made on implementing a Middle East NWFZ. The continued impasse on this issue threatens to significantly reduce the legitimacy of the NPT, diminish security in an already unstable region, and trigger widespread nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

In general, NWFZ are positive steps towards nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In the Middle East, regional disputes, Israel’s nuclear arsenal, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions threaten both regional and global security, making a Middle East NWFZ vital to peace and security. Israel shows no intention of signing the NPT or disarming, while Iran’s covert nuclear program leads many to believe that its government is seeking nuclear weapons capabilities. At least a dozen Middle East governments have expressed interest in developing enrichment and processing programs for nuclear energy, with which they could easily reach breakout capacity. Governments that have passively accepted one nuclear state in the region are unlikely to accept two nuclear states, leading to the strong possibility of a Middle East arms race.

In addition to regional stability in the Middle East, the future legitimacy of the NPT is an important concern. At the 1995 Review and Treaty Extension Conference, the resolution to establish a Middle East NWFZ (adopted by consensus as part of the final document) is one of the key reasons that it was agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. Without this resolution, Arab states were not willing to extend the NPT because Israel would likely remain outside of the NPT. The Middle East resolution was viewed as the only way to bring Israel into the nonproliferation/disarmament regime. The manifest lack of progress on the implementation of the Middle East resolution threatens the nonproliferation regime. States parties are likely to view the NPT as non-binding if progress is not made, increasing the potential for non-compliance with treaty obligations and/or withdrawal. Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva and the Conference of Disarmament, Hisham Badr, warned last month “a Middle East resolution would be ‘pivotal’ to the success of the review conference and the future of the arms control treaty.”²

The Arab and Israeli views on a starting point for negotiations have always been at opposite ends of the spectrum, making initiating negotiations virtually impossible. Israel requires peace and the normalization of relations prior to any serious arms control negotiations. Arabs argue that a Middle East NWFZ is a necessary prerequisite to sustainable peace and security. The last serious attempt at negotiations, through the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, broke down in 1996 amidst Egypt’s refusal to continue negotiations without linking peace and security issues to Israel’s nuclear disarmament. These two diverse views are not mutually exclusive—the 2010 NPT Review Conference is an excellent place for all Middle East governments to concede that getting to a Middle East NWFZ requires a parallel process—negotiating both peace and disarmament simultaneously.

The following confidence building measures (CBMs) are recommended to establish the political will to begin serious negotiations:

• In order to signal Israel’s desire to conform to the international nonproliferation and disarmament norm, Israel must place its nuclear program under IAEA safeguards and subject itself to informal IAEA inspections
• Middle East governments should implement a No First Use of WMD agreement
• All sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities should be frozen
• Egypt, Iran, and Israel should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and all states in the Middle East that have not done so should ratify other WMD related treaties (e.g. Chemical Weapons Convention)

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament also recommends that the UN Secretary-General should convene a conference of the relevant states to identify ways to implement the 1995 Middle East resolution.³ Such a conference could identify additional mutual CBMs and establish the political will necessary to implement a Middle East NWFZ.

A Middle East NWFZ is imperative to a stable and secure Middle East, to global security, and to the success of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime in the 21st century. The upcoming NPT Review Conference must move forward on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution.