Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

In May, President Obama submitted to the Senate protocols NWFZs in Africa and the South Pacific, the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga, respectively. Both treaties prohibit states parties from possessing nuclear weapons and require full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on any peaceful use nuclear facilities within the zones. The protocols to the treaties, which are open for signature and ratification by the nuclear weapons states, provide important negative security assurances. If ratified, the U.S. agrees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states parties, contribute to any violations of the treaty, or test nuclear weapons in the zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga also prohibits the U.S. from manufacturing nuclear weapons in the territories for which it is responsible, American Samoa and Jarvis Island.

NWFZs are an important step in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The treaties often require that parties comply with the highest international safeguards standards. Stronger safeguards decrease the potential for nuclear accident, theft, or diversion of fissile material to secret weapons programs. The treaties also strengthen export controls, which helps to prevent the illicit trade and use of nuclear technology and fissile material. Regional agreements also establish regional bodies that have a greater ability to ensure compliance, creating a support system for an under-budgeted and under-staffed IAEA. Regional commitments are more likely to be credible, as the close proximity creates more pressing national security concerns.

By ratifying the protocols, the U.S. reinforces both its credibility and commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. As a major nuclear power, it is critical that the U.S. makes a significant effort to reinforce words with action. In the letters of transmittal to the Senate, President Obama states that ratifying the protocols is in the best interest of the U.S. because they will strengthen relationships with our allies and enhance U.S. security.¹ Currently, the protocols to the two treaties are being reviewed in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Nuclear Cooperation

In the current legislative session, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Howard Berman both submitted bills to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements with foreign countries for peaceful nuclear cooperation. As the law stands now, Congress has 90 days to review these agreements, which are known as “123 Agreements.” If the 90 days expires without congressional consideration, the agreement automatically goes into affect. This legislation is aimed at strengthening global non-proliferation standards—the only agreements that are exempt are those where the recipient agrees not to produce nuclear fuel. Congress would have additional oversight powers on peaceful nuclear cooperation, which would help to prevent double standards and encourage developing states to uphold international safeguards standards. The final bill combined provisions from both Ros-Lehtinen and Berman’s bills in a markup session, and passed through the House Foreign Affairs committee in April, but has not yet undergone a full vote.

Modernization and Disarmament

Representative Michael Turner submitted a bill to the House aimed at ensuring the modernization of the nuclear arsenal, one of the concessions President Obama made during the New START ratification debate. The bill also restricts the President from making unilateral reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal or any changes to the nuclear employment strategy. Although this bill remains in the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, similar provisions are included in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which passed in the House last week. Sections 1055 and 1056 of the defense bill state that no funding can be spent to retire nuclear weapons (as required by New START) unless the Secretaries of Defense and Energy certify that the remaining arsenal is being modernized. The defense bill also requires congressional approval, either via treaty or other legislation, for any future reductions of the U.S. nuclear force and requires the President to consult Congress before making any changes to U.S. nuclear employment strategy.

President Obama strongly objects to these two sections of the defense bill, and will likely veto the legislation. By limiting the administration’s ability to implement New START, these provisions present a serious challenge to U.S. nonproliferation and disarmament goals. Noncompliance with New START would have a detrimental effect on U.S. credibility, and the ability of the administration to negotiate additional arms control treaties with Russia. These provisions also encroach on the President’s authority on foreign policy matters, and threaten to undermine the ability of the U.S. to make further progress on nuclear disarmament.